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Abstract 
Proportional representation is often thought a democratic ideal. But whatever proportional 
representation’s virtues in ordinary politics, it is poorly suited to sustaining democratic legitimacy in 
what might, speaking loosely, be called constitutional politics. Proportional representation may fairly 
balance citizens’ views concerning incremental policy innovation. But proportional representation 
succeeds less well at uniting individual citizens’ wills into a sovereign decision concerning the basic 
structure of the social contract.  
This is not just an abstract problem. Many of the world’s most mature democracies (including 
especially in Europe) face constitutional choices in this loose sense—choices concerning the scope 
and character of their political orders. At the same time, citizens of the mature democracies are losing 
confidence in the democratic practices and institutions through which these and other constitutional 
decisions must inevitably be made.  
The mismatch between proportional representation and constitutional politics contributes to the 
current crisis of democratic legitimacy in Europe and, surprisingly, also in the United States. European 
democracies’ explicit embrace of proportional representation makes it natural for the argument to take 
up the European case. The American case is included in part for its own sake, as the nature and even 
the existence of an American drift towards de facto proportional representation is not widely 
appreciated. The American case is also included because it might introduce novel ideas to this 
Working Paper Series’ European audience, which will naturally have attended only casually to recent 
American developments. 
Keywords 
Democracy, proportional representation, constitutionalism, European integration 
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1* 
Proportional representation is often thought a democratic ideal: fairer, more sensitive, and more 
accurate than alternative mechanisms of democratic decision. These pages conjecture that whatever 
proportional representation’s virtues in ordinary politics, it is poorly suited to sustaining democratic 
legitimacy in what might, speaking loosely, be called constitutional politics. Perhaps proportional 
representation fairly, sensitively, and accurately balances citizens’ views concerning incremental 
policy innovation. But proportional representation succeeds less well at uniting individual citizens’ 
wills into a sovereign decision concerning the basic structure of the social contract.  
This is not just an abstract problem. Many of the world’s most mature democracies face 
constitutional choices: European states must decide whether a fiscal union will follow a monetary one; 
and the United States must decide whether to reject or to reaffirm the national social welfare state 
established in the New Deal. Increased economic and looming geo-political competition from states 
with emerging economies fixes stressful background conditions against which both choices arise. Each 
will determine the scope and character of the political orders in which it is made, for at least a 
generation. That is what makes these choices, in the loose sense, constitutional. 
At the same time, citizens of the mature democracies are losing confidence in the democratic 
practices and institutions through which these and other constitutional decisions must inevitably be 
made. A recent Italian opinion poll, for example, reports that citizen confidence in the governing 
political parties ranges from four to ten percent.
1
 And in the United States, the most recent Gallup 
“Confidence in Institutions” poll reports that Congress enjoys high confidence among only 12 percent 
of respondents, less than half the historical average and the less than the confidence enjoyed by any 
other of the sixteen public institutions included in the poll.
2
  
The citizens’ lagging democratic faith no doubt has many causes. The stresses that established 
democracies face will naturally strain confidence in every political system; and the purely instrumental 
ineffectiveness of the policies through which governing elites are responding to these stresses—
austerity in Europe has not produced growth, and stimulus in the United States has not increased 
employment—can only increase the strains. One need not look far to connect economic causes to 
political consequences.
3
 
Perhaps, however, the mature democracies’ loss of political faith has an additional, political 
explanation. Perhaps the mismatch between proportional representation and constitutional politics 
contributes to the current crisis of democratic legitimacy in Europe and, surprisingly, also in the 
United States. European democracies’ explicit embrace of proportional representation makes it natural 
for the argument to take up the European case. The American case is included in part for its own sake, 
                                                     
* I would like to thank Miguel Maduro and the participants in the EUI’s June 2012 Executive Seminar on “Political 
Participation in a Globalised World” for generous and insightful discussions of themes related to the argument developed 
here. 
1
 Tony Barber, Europe Must Confront Crisis of Legitimacy, FINANCIAL TIMES (Apr. 23, 2012, 5:13 pm), available at 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/4e2c793c-8d50-11e1-8b49-00144feab49a.html#axzz1yCqwMOSJ.  
2
 Jeffrey M. Jones, Americans Most Confident in Military, Least in Congress, GALLUP (June 23, 2011), available at 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/148163/Americans-Confident-Military-Least-Congress.aspx. The “Confidence in 
Institutions” poll is conducted annually. The most recent results available on the Gallup website are from 2011; figures 
for 2012 may be forthcoming later this summer. The other institutions, in the order of public confidence, are the military, 
small business, the police, the church or organized religion, the medical system, the U.S. Supreme Court, the presidency, 
the public schools, the criminal justice system, newspapers, television news, banks, organized labor, big business, and 
health maintenance organizations.  
3
 Other explanations—for example, the corrosive influence of money and proprietary media on political campaigns, 
especially in the United States—also naturally present themselves.  
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as the nature and even the existence of an American drift towards de facto proportional representation 
is not widely appreciated. The American case is also included because it might introduce novel ideas 
to this Working Paper Series’ European audience, which will naturally have attended only casually to 
recent American developments. 
The arguments that follow are speculative at every step. They conjecture only, and do not purport 
to demonstrate. Their point, as suits a Working Paper, is credibly to raise a possibility rather than 
authoritatively to assess it. 
2 
The argument aspires to display the particular problems associated with the democratic legitimacy of 
constitutional politics implemented through proportional representation. But before it can move 
forward to take up this particular case, the argument must step back to consider democratic politics 
more generally. What are the bases of democratic legitimacy? 
Democracy, at its conceptual core, is collective self-government—that is the form of political life 
in which collective decisions are made by the entire body politic, including all of the governed.
4
 
Different democratic systems present divergent institutional elaborations of this idea, to be sure. But 
all modern large-scale democracies include two basic, structural features. A successful theory of 
democracy—a theory that captures the intuitive appeal of democratic practice—must explain at least 
these features.  
First, although democracies all incorporate a majoritarian element (and certainly reject 
concentrating political power in a minority caste or class), no democracy adopts simple, direct 
majority rule. To begin with, the counting rules by which democracies convert votes into policy 
uniformly depart from flat-footed majoritarianism. Most immediately, modern democracies depart 
from simple majoritarianism by employing representative government rather than just direct referenda. 
They also (at least since Burke’s time5) self-consciously insist that representatives enjoy broad 
discretion to follow their consciences even against their constituents’ preferences. Democracies 
additionally accept and indeed celebrate methods of preference aggregation—involving, in various 
combinations, electoral districts, multi-tiered elections, and divided government—that all depart from 
choosing policies simply by adding up votes to see which policy alternative receives more. Finally, 
modern democracies depart from simple majoritarianism in that they are not merely systems of voting 
and counting votes. Instead, democratic political systems support, and indeed require, forms of 
political activity that aim to change how the votes that will eventually be counted are cast. 
Accordingly, not just elections but also constitutional protections for freedom of expression (both by 
individuals and through an institutionalized independent press), freedom of assembly, political parties, 
and organized election campaigns all belong to the characteristic forms of democratic politics.
6
 
And second, democracies apply the mechanisms for collective decision just described broadly, to 
decide nearly the full range of disputes that collective political life engenders. Thus, although most 
democratic constitutions typically entrench some basic protections for individual rights and minority 
interests against majoritarian usurpation, these rights-based limits on democracy are always carefully 
defined and narrowly cabined exceptions to a general principle of democratic authority. Most 
importantly, democratic politics does not shy away from deciding matters of moral principle. The 
                                                     
4
 This general understanding of democracy is as old at least as Aristotle’s Politics.  
5
 See Edmund Burke, Speech on Fox’s India Bill (Dec. 1, 1783), in 5 THE WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF EDMUND BURKE: 
INDIA: MADRAS AND BENGAL, 1774-85, at 378 (Paul Langford et al. eds., 1981).  
6
 Note that judicial review, in the American sense that gives courts the power to invalidate legislative actions as 
unconstitutional, is not on this list.  
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range of subjects that democratic politics reaches varies from democracy to democracy.
7
 But every 
democracy extends the authority of the democratic process not just to balancing citizens’ preferences 
but also to deciding conflicts among citizens’ values, including prominently conflicts among citizens’ 
competing conceptions of justice. Indeed, democracies typically provide constitutional guarantees for 
justice-based democratic political participation, including through the constitutional protections 
mentioned in the past paragraph. A summary indicator of these guarantees’ power to expand the scope 
of democratic decision is the permissible place of comprehensive moral ideals in democratic politics. 
In spite of occasional suggestions that political participation should be cleansed of controversial 
comprehensive ideals before it is inserted into democratic politics, no actual democracy insists on this. 
To the contrary, such ideals—for example, Christian commitments in favor of universal love cited as 
grounds for opposing racial segregation—have had longstanding and influential careers in democratic 
politics. In this way, democracies include what were earlier called constitutional questions within the 
scope of democratic politics.  
Constitutional politics in this loose sense is not limited to the interpretation of a legal tradition or 
written text (where one exists) that is given the technical label “constitutional” by professional 
lawyers. Rather, it encompasses all political disputes concerning the basic structure of a society’s 
social contract. Constitutional politics thus includes fixing the functional allocation of a state’s core 
decision-making competences and the basic outlines of its versions of the market and the welfare-
state. Once again, the questions that contemporary Europe faces concerning fiscal union (and 
associated austerities) and that the contemporary United States faces concerning health care, pensions, 
and the base-line size of the Federal government are both constitutional in this general sense. 
Any adequate and sympathetic reconstruction of democratic practice must explain both these core 
features of democratic politics.  
A familiar view—for a time the dominant view among political philosophers—holds that 
democracy constitutes a branch office of the general practice of liberal equality. A narrow version of 
this view treats democracy as equality applied directly to the allocation of political power. This view 
of democracy appears in Rawls’s early work, as in the suggestion that “[p]erhaps the most obvious 
political inequality is the violation of the precept one person one vote.”8 An alternative, broader 
version of the view acknowledges that democracy does not directly produce an equal distribution 
specifically of political power, and instead proposes that it indirectly enables citizens to relate to one 
another on equal terms more generally. According to this account, democracy’s principal contribution 
to political equality is to foreclose certain arguments and arrangements, for example based on 
hierarchies of status or caste, that are broadly inimical to equality. Ronald Dworkin, for example, 
develops a version of this broader view, elaborating an account of democracy expressly in response to 
the question, “How would a community based on equal concern [for all its members] choose its 
representative officials?”9  
Nevertheless, in spite of its intuitive appeal and philosophical prominence, the suggestion that 
democracy promotes the political equality of all citizens cannot accommodate the central features of 
democratic politics identified a moment ago. 
Thus the narrow conception of democracy as political equality cannot accommodate the many 
departures from simple majoritarianism on which democracies uniformly insist. Democracy secures 
neither the equal impact on policy of citizens’ direct choices or votes nor the equal influence on policy 
                                                     
7
 European states thus tend to give liberal rights a broader scope and democratic sovereignty a narrower scope than the 
political culture of the United States.  
8
 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 231 (1971). Rawls’s final views were subtler than this simple remark reveals. See id. 
at 232 ff.  
9
 RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY 184 (2000).  
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of citizens’ broader political interventions.10 Democracies straightforwardly violate equality of impact 
in any number of ways. Democracy’s representative element (especially insofar as representatives 
jealously guard their discretion to follow their consciences) necessarily gives unequal impact to 
ordinary citizens and public officials. And the intricate methods by which democracies, departing from 
simple majority rule, aggregate votes only exacerbate inequalities of impact—including by creating 
inequalities even among ordinary citizens (and, for that matter, also among representatives who hold 
equivalent offices). Moreover, democracies also violate equality of influence. They permit political 
practices—for example, public deliberation (including through a free press), and activist campaigning 
(including through organized political parties)—whose principal aim is to achieve unequal influence.11 
Crucially, democracies self-consciously champion both departures from equality: a political process 
that abandoned every form of representation or that prohibited the practices generating unequal 
influence would commonly and properly be thought clearly undemocratic.
12
 
The broad conception of democracy as political equality, for its part, fails because it cannot 
accommodate the scope of democratic practice and, in particular, the fact that democracy’s authority 
reaches even constitutional politics. The broad conception, recall, defended democracy not because it 
equally allocates political power specifically but rather because it enables citizens to stand in a 
generally egalitarian relation to one another. The enabling may be instrumental, as in Dworkin’s 
suggestion that democracy is the form of government “most likely to produce the substantive decisions 
and results that treat all members of the community with equal concern.”13 Or the enabling may be 
intrinsic and constitutive, as in suggestions that the rejection of political caste orders associated with 
democracy constitutes citizens as equals more generally
14—so that political democracy properly-so-
called is also culturally and socially democratic, as might be said. Neither suggestion persuades, 
however. Democratic resolutions of disputes concerning justice, and especially democratic 
constitutional politics, can predictably—in some cases even reliably—cause unequal substantive 
policies and constitute inegalitarian cultural and social orders. The outbreaks of democratic 
nationalism that followed the end of the Cold War represent notable and extreme instances of this 
lesson.
15
  
Likely for this reason, defenders of the broad conception of democracy typically propose to 
constrain the scope of democratic politics properly-so-called in the service of their broader egalitarian 
aims. Dworkin, for example, admits that democracy merely serves the end of “improv[ing] the 
accuracy” of political decisions, by making them more consistent with the demands of liberal 
equality.
16
 The broad view thus places democratic decisionmaking, in the intuitive sense associated 
with voting and elections, at the mercy of these substantive values, so that voting must give way to 
equality’s demands whenever the two conflict. The resulting constraints on democratic politics are 
dramatic indeed. Dworkin would limit majoritarian decision-making to the narrow (and indeed almost 
                                                     
10
 The distinction between impact and influence follows RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND 
PRACTICE OF EQUALITY 184 (2000).  
11
 None of this, of course, is to say that democracies should or indeed may accept every form of inequality of influence. In 
particular, unequal influence whose sole ground is unequal wealth is commonly, and plausibly, thought to be anti-
democratic, and many democracies take steps to eliminate it by insulating political power from economic power. The 
United States, in particular its Supreme Court’s recent decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 
U.S. 50 (2010), is increasingly an outlier in this respect.  
12
 Dworkin makes this point also. See RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY 
194-98 (2000). Others have made similar observations. See, e.g., Robert Post, Equality and Autonomy in First 
Amendment Jurisprudence, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1517, 1523-24 (1997) (book review).  
13
 RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY 186 (2000).  
14
 I owe this formulation to a conversation with Daniel Viehoff.  
15
 A vivid general treatment is AMY CHUA, THE WORLD ON FIRE (2002).  
16
 RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY 204 (2000).  
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vanishing
17
) class of what he calls choice-sensitive issues, that is, issues “whose correct solution, as a 
matter of justice, depends essentially on the character and distribution of preferences within the 
political community.”18 Rawls perhaps sums up the status of this conception of democracy most 
clearly, when he admits that if democracy serves liberal equality, then we should “submit our conduct 
to democratic authority only to the extent necessary to share equitably in the inevitable imperfections 
of a constitutional system.”19 This crimped conception is once again belied by the lived experience of 
democratic politics: even if the extremes of democratic nationalism are illegitimate, democratic 
resolutions to conflicts concerning justice, including to constitutional conflicts in the loose sense, 
remain the norm in legitimate democratic states.  
Finally, neither the narrow nor the broad version of the liberal view can accommodate democracy 
concerning what might be called the boundaries of politics. The idea that democracy is political 
equality cannot answer the questions: equality among whom and of what? It cannot fix the extension of 
the state and hence the outer boundaries of the set of citizens who are to be equal and thus who will 
participate in democratic politics going forward; and it cannot fix the intensity of the state and hence 
the reach of a political order into the social, cultural, and economic lives of the citizens subject to it. 
Questions in these veins have in recent years returned to the forefront of the actual politics of mature 
democracies: citizens of some member states of the European Union (for example, Greece) are being 
forced to decide to what degree their domestic public policy should become, as of right, subject to 
regulation by politics among citizens of other member states (for example, Germany); and citizens of 
the United States must decide what share of GDP should be placed directly under state regulation and 
control. Applying the idea of equality to politics does not require any particular answer to these 
choices, because they concern the antecedent questions what scope (along dimensions of extension 
and intensity) politics should have, and hence across what persons and with respect to what resources 
political equality should apply. 
Together, these arguments reveal that suggestions that democracy is simply a (political) branch 
office of liberal equality cannot, in several respects, explain actual democratic practice. 
An alternative account of democracy, more republican than liberal, emphasizes that democratic 
politics squares individual freedom and collective government,
20
 roughly by sustaining agreement 
                                                     
17
 Dworkin observes that “[t]hough it might seem odd,” he believes that it is “sensible” even “to speak of a decision . . . to 
give aid to the [Nicaraguan] Contras as either accurate or inaccurate,” so that his liberal conception of democracy 
requires that this decision be made accurately, regardless of citizens’ actual preferences or the outcomes of a majoritarian 
process. Id. at 204. As an example of a choice-sensitive issue, Dworkin imagines the decision “whether to use available 
public funds to build a new sports center or a new road system,” although even here he suggests that choice-insensitive 
issues like distributive justice may “merge in that decision.” Id. at 204.  
18
 Id. at 204. Dworkin thus insists that the democratic process must defer to substantive principles of equality concerning 
“the distribution of resources and opportunities into private ownership, about the use of collective power and resources in 
public programs and foreign policy, about saving and conservation, and about the other topics of public principle and 
policy that confront a modern government.” Id. at 204. 
19
 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 355 (1971). Thus Rawls’s theory of justice restricts the democratic process by 
imposing substantive requirements on policy concerning not just basic liberties but the distributions of all primary goods, 
including income and wealth, powers and opportunities, and even the social bases of self-respect. See id. at 62.  
20
 Republican theories of democracy are commonly said to replace the liberal emphasis on equality with an emphasis on 
liberty. Thus the republican theory has been thought to address itself to what Post calls “[t]he essential problematic of 
democracy,” namely, “the reconciliation of individual and collective autonomy.” ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL 
DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT 7 (1995). In particular, the republican idea of individual authorship 
of collective decisions has been thought to solve this problematic, as in Hans Kelsen’s observation that “[a] subject is 
politically free insofar as his individual will is in harmony with the ‘collective’ (or ‘general’) will expressed in the social 
order. Such harmony of the ‘collective’ and the individual will is guaranteed only if the social order is created by the 
individuals whose behavior it regulates.” HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 285 (Anders Wedberg 
trans., 1945).  
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about which political decisions to obey even in the face of entrenched disagreement about which 
decisions to adopt. The liberal approaches treat the democratic political process as transparent, so that 
citizens’ preferences and values are not changed by their democratic engagements, and principles of 
liberal equality apply in the same way, to support the same policies, before and after democratic 
politics has occurred. The republican account of democracy, by contrast, emphasizes the 
transformative aspects of the democratic process: democracy can reconcile individual freedom with 
collective government because democratic politics changes the preferences and values of the 
individual citizens who employ it to reach collective decisions. 
The republican theory of democracy familiarly proposes that democratic citizens, uniting to form a 
democratic sovereign, share authorship of the collective decisions by which they live.
21
 This is what 
led Rousseau to observe that democracy combines the private wills of the several citizens into a 
general will, through which each embraces all the laws as his own, including “even . . . those passed 
against his [private] will,”22 so that democratic sovereignty provides a political mechanism through 
which each person “uniting with all, nevertheless obeys only himself and remains as free as before.”23 
As Alexander Bickel said (implicitly contrasting liberal and republican conceptions of democracy), the 
republican account casts democracy “not merely as a sharer of power but as a generator of consent.”24  
The democratic political process serves, on the republican view, to sustain this embrace. The 
central challenge for democratic theory is to identify the “social processes . . . that somehow connect 
the democratic system as a whole to the autonomous will of the entire citizenry,”25 and, moreover, to 
explain in useful detail how the connection is established. Note that posing the question in these terms 
at once makes clear why democracies must depart from flat-footed, directly majoritarian preference 
aggregation. Simple aggregation—accomplished, for example, through continuous direct referenda 
among policy options—could not possibly transform citizens’ preferences and values and would 
therefore generate political alienation rather than shared authorship of collective decisions.
26
 
(Contd.)                                                                  
 It is surely right to observe the role of individual freedom in republican political thought, but this emphasis alone cannot 
sustain the republican view. The observation concerning freedom simply assumes that democratic politics can sustain the 
individual embrace of the collective will rather than explaining how this embrace is actually achieved. The materials 
below identify the mechanisms through which citizens come to embrace democratic sovereignty. For a discussion of the 
aspects of human nature that allow these mechanisms to function—the human interests that democratic sovereignty 
serves—see Daniel Markovits, Democratic Disobedience, 114 YALE LAW JOURNAL 1897 (2005). The discussion that 
follows here also reprises and builds on that text.  
21
 See Robert C. Post, Democracy and Equality, 1 LAW CULTURE & HUMAN. (2005). 
22
 JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 110 (Roger D. Masters ed., Judith R. Masters trans., St. Martin’s 
Press 1978) (1762). Rousseau thought that this logic applies even “to those [laws] that punish [a citizen] when he dares to 
violate one of them.” Id. Indeed, he added, imagining a conflict between his private will and the democratic (general) 
will, that “[i]f [the] private will had prevailed, I would have done something other than what I wanted. It is then that I 
would not have been free.” JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 111 (Roger D. Masters ed., Judith R. 
Masters trans., St. Martin’s Press 1978) (1762).  
 These remarks suggest that Rousseau thought that a well-functioning democratic process not only transforms but 
subsumes citizens’ individual political agency. But the republican view need not go to such extremes—carrying the 
participation in a collective will that democratic sovereignty involves into a denial of individuality—to sustain its central 
point. 
23
 JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 53 (Roger D. Masters ed., Judith R. Masters trans., St. Martin’s 
Press 1978) (1762).  
24
 ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 15 (1975). Bickel was commenting approvingly on Edmund Burke’s 
defense of the right of elected representatives to vote their consciences and the related authority of representative 
government. See Edmund Burke, Speech on Fox’s India Bill (Dec. 1, 1783), in 5 THE WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF 
EDMUND BURKE: INDIA: MADRAS AND BENGAL, 1774-85, at 378 (Paul Langford et al. eds., 1981).  
25
 Robert C. Post, Between Democracy and Community: The Legal Constitution of Social Form, in NOMOS XXXV: 
DEMOCRATIC COMMUNITY 163, 170 (John W. Chapman & Ian Shapiro eds., 1993).  
26
 A related observation appears in Robert Post, Equality and Autonomy in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 95 MICH. L. 
REV. 1517, 1523-24 (1997) (book review).  
A Problem Concerning Proportional Representation: Constitutional Politics and the Crisis of Democratic Legitimacy 
7 
The central means through which democracies establish transformative political procedures and 
encourage legitimating political engagements is representation. Every modern, mass democracy 
employs representatives in its principal mechanisms of political decision, and some forswear direct 
democracy entirely and employ representation exclusively.
27
 Representation itself, and the several 
associated political practices that necessarily arise around representation, contribute to democratic 
legitimacy in several ways.  
To begin with, the creation of representative offices encourages participants in democratic politics 
to pursue not raw power (that is, the direct capacity to implement policy) but rather the intermediate 
end of political office, narrowly understood. Political offices, being creatures of the wider political 
system in which they appear, can be obtained only against the backdrop of the procedures that this 
system employs for allocating them. (Revolutionaries may implement policy when they overthrow a 
government, but they cannot become Senators.) And this encourages would-be officials to recast their 
political ambitions in forms that implicitly embrace the legitimacy of democratic decisions—the forms 
of authority, recognition, and constraint implicit in the idea of political offices with specified but 
limited powers. Democratic representation also stimulates legitimating engagements among non-
elected political actors (voter, after all, is itself a public office). By channeling decision through 
representative officers, representative democracies create the opportunity, and also the necessity, for 
citizens generally who wish to influence outcomes to do so through argument, persuasion, and 
pressure—through political engagement—and not just, as in simple majority-rule, by revealing their 
individual preferences in political isolation. Representatives serve as focal points for political 
deliberation and for the reciprocal recognition that deliberation involves.  
Moreover, and critically, representative democracy, by creating a quasi-professional form of 
democratic officialdom, encourages the formation of political parties. Political parties obviously serve 
as sites for elite level political engagements among their members who hold public office. Less 
obviously, but no less importantly, the mass parties that accompany representative democracy 
(democratic political parties characteristically penetrate widely and deeply into the overall citizenry) 
implicate non-office-holding party members in democratic legitimacy. It is often thought that political 
parties are important primarily because they connect the political system, and in particular political 
elites, to the masses (serving to keep ruling elites informed of the wishes of the people). But the 
greatest contribution that political parties (and especially democratic mass parties) make to politics 
may be rather to bring the masses within the political system. Political parties channel the political 
ambitions of their mass-membership into forms that implicitly recognize the legitimacy of democratic 
decision, including even when they have lost an election.
28
 
                                                     
27
 One prominent country even makes direct democracy constitutionally suspect. The German Grundgesetz expressly 
declares the Federal Republic of Germany a representative democracy, in which sovereignty is exercised through specific 
legislative organs (“durch besondere Organe der Gesetzgebung”) rather than by the people directly. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] 
art. 20(2) (F.R.G.), see also Horst Dreier, Demokratie, in 2 GRUNDGESETZ KOMMENTAR 20, 31 (Horst Dreier ed., 1998) 
(connecting the “broad-ranging exclusion of direct-democratic elements” from German politics to article 20(2) of the 
Grundgesetz). Moreover, this feature of the German political system has been expressly connected to skepticism about 
the consequences of direct popular political engagement, as for example in Theodor Heuss’s remark in the constitutional 
assembly that drafted the Grundgesetz that direct democracy merely presents a “bonus [or welcome reward] for every 
demagogue.” id. at 32. Direct democracy is not entirely excluded from German politics. The German Länder are 
permitted to adopt forms of direct democracy. See, Friedrich E. Schnapp, Der Bund und die Länder, in 2 GRUNDGESETZ-
KOMMENTAR 1, 8-9 (Ingo von Münch & Philip Kunig eds., 2001). And the Grundgesetz expressly contemplates that 
changes in the borders of the German states be proposed by parliamentary legislation and confirmed by popular 
referenda. See GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 29(2) (F.R.G.).  
28
 Something like this suggestion, cast in historical terms, appears in RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE IDEA OF A PARTY SYSTEM: 
THE RISE OF LEGITIMATE OPPOSITION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1780-1840 (1969). An underappreciated early account is 
MARTIN VAN BUREN, INQUIRY INTO THE ORIGIN AND COURSE OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE UNITED STATES (Smith T. Van 
Buren et al. eds., New York, Hurd & Houghton 1867). 
 Parties play a similar channeling function even at the parliamentary level, where they help to coordinate the agendas of 
multiple legislators and also to coordinate the agendas of the several branches of government (or at least of party-factions 
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Actual democracies fill in this outline of the basic representative model and secure legitimacy in 
different ways, depending on the structures of their democratic practices. It is worthwhile to 
distinguish between two pure or ideal typical approaches to the filling in, even if only to fix ideas and 
to structure the subsequent argument. 
One ideal-typical democratic form structures politics around proportional representation. 
Proportional representation encourages politicians (office-holders and candidates for office) to 
organize themselves into disciplined, cohesive political parties that speak to their base supporters and 
try to grow their bases, but do not emphasize drawing substantial transient electoral support from 
across party lines. At the same time, especially where proportional representation is combined with an 
official politics structured in the manner of parliamentary government, office-holders are encouraged 
to engage in wide-ranging parliamentary negotiations across party lines, in order to form stable and 
effective governing coalitions. Popular political engagement under proportional representation thus 
arises in the internal deliberations that parties have with their core supporters, perhaps as they go about 
drafting a party platform. Voters become party supporters through a process that includes engagement 
and compromise across limited political difference in fixing the agenda that elected officials will, 
following their party platform, pursue.
29
 Official political engagement arises paradigmatically through 
parliamentary negotiations: through the cross-ideological disputes that political coalitions bridge and 
through the within-ideological party discipline that successful parliamentary maneuvering requires.
30
 
Finally, the elite political compromises associated with coalition building are legitimated at the 
popular level by each party’s officials’ connections to that parties’ supporters, and in particular by the 
supporters’ trust that their representatives will serve as their faithful agents in parliament. Indeed, 
some commentators have gone so far as to say that under proportional representation, “most 
candidates serve primarily as conduits for communicating the party platform to the public.”31  
This species of democracy—which might be called the European model—thus substantially 
suppresses direct popular political engagement across fundamental ideological divides and, at the 
same time, encourages just this sort of official political engagement. Officials selected through 
proportional representation are elected by, and represent, specifically those voters who support them.
32
 
They then make political compromises amongst themselves and sell the compromises to mass-
supporters who were never directly engaged in making them. 
An alternative ideal-typical democratic form structures popular politics by first-past-the-post voting 
in single member electoral districts. This electoral mechanism encourages popular political 
engagement across ideological difference directly in connection with electioneering. In order to 
achieve and retain office (to win elections) candidates and officials must craft electoral majorities in 
constituencies, brought together by nothing more than geography, in which nearly the full range of 
popular political opinion is represented. This familiarly encourages moderation in candidates, who 
(Contd.)                                                                  
within them). See, e.g., Nathaniel Persily and Bruce E. Cain, The Legal Status of Political Parties: A Reassessment of the 
Competing Paradigms, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 775, 787 (2000).  
29
 The degree of direct popular political engagement across partisan difference may well be lower under proportional 
representation, while the degree of engagement across difference among elites may (in view of the importance of 
coalition-building) be greater. Moreover, this pattern plausibly accounts for the appeal of proportional representation to 
those who are skeptical of too much direct popular politics.  
30
 See, e.g., DENNIS C. MEULLER, CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 105 (1996). Note that, at least under closed list 
proportional representation, party control over the membership and order of the lists from which officeholders are elected 
provides a powerful method for enforcing party discipline. See VERNON BOGDANOR, WHAT IS PROPORTIONAL 
REPRESENTATION? A GUIDE TO THE ISSUES 136 (1984).  
31
 DOUGLAS J. AMY, REACH CHOICES/NEW VOICES: HOW PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS COULD REVITALIZE 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 79 (2d ed. 2002).  
32
 Indeed, it has even been suggested that officeholders elected under proportional representation serve not as delegates 
entitled to vote their consciences but rather as trustees, obligated to pursue the platform that their party has communicated 
to its supporters. See, e.g., DAVID M. FARRELL, ELECTORAL SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE INTRODUCTION 170-71 (2001).  
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must court median voters in order to win elections.
33
 Less familiarly, this moderation is accompanied 
by broad-ranging political engagement both between candidates and constituents and among 
constituents. The geographic rather than ideological nature of constituencies requires candidates to 
represent the interests of all voters in their districts and not just their supporters. Accordingly, the 
nature of elections in such systems causes citizens of all political persuasions to elect their 
representatives across their disagreements. This form of popular politics may be combined, at the 
official level, with parliamentary government as in Great Britain or with a presidential system, as in 
the United States. The character of official political engagement under first-past-the-post 
electioneering depends on the structure of government. American presidentialism reduces the 
importance of party discipline in the legislature (by removing the risk of a vote of no-confidence) and 
thus tends towards abandoning the ideologically cohesive, internally disciplined political party as a 
matrix for official political engagement. At the same time, the American emphasis on the separation of 
powers (and also on federalism
34
) fragments officialdom, creating bottlenecks in the process of 
governing that encourage political engagement directly among office holders, who must compromise 
across the branches of government in order effectively to govern. British parliamentarianism, by 
contrast, retains incentives to party discipline, and so internal party-politics remains a significant 
source of official political engagement in Britain. The British also foster official politics (including in 
the generic rather than party-partisan sense) through their non-elective government institutions, 
including the House of Lords (pending its reform) and the highly elaborate civil service, and through 
civil society institutions (labor unions, an official press, an established church, and any number of 
expert and evaluative guilds, societies, and commissions) that constitute free-standing centers of 
power and hence also politics.  
This Anglo-American model of democracy thus encourages and indeed prioritizes direct popular 
political engagements, which it makes the centerpiece of democratic politics and legitimation. The 
Anglo-American model encourages official political engagements in a piecemeal fashion only. 
One might summarize the difference between the European and the Anglo-American models of 
democratic sovereignty in the following way. Political solidarity arises indirectly on the European 
model, as the mass-citizenry engages across its deepest political disagreements only through the 
official negotiations among agents whose ideological principals elect separately. By contrast, political 
solidarity on the Anglo-American model arises directly, as the mass-citizenry of each district elects its 
official representative together.
35
 
These accounts of the two ideal types merely introduce special cases of the generic republican 
approach to sustaining democratic legitimacy. Fully to understand any particular species of democratic 
legitimacy of course requires much more institutional (and also cultural and historical) detail. But the 
rough sketches of ideal types suffice to show that the various patterns of engagement used to sustain 
                                                     
33
 This result, first established by Hotelling, is now one of the mainstays of positive political science. See, e.g., DENNIS C. 
MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 98-105 (1979); see also JAMES M. ENELOW & MELVIN J. HINICH, THE SPATIAL THEORY OF 
VOTING: AN INTRODUCTION 12-13 (1984).  
34
 The structure of American officialdom also encourages official political engagement in another way. The most important 
offices are structured to draw different characters of officials to them: the Senate’s longer terms and fixed, state-wide 
districts were designed to make Senators more patrician and less partisan than Representatives, who are elected to the 
House for shorter terms and from narrower and regularly redrawn districts (and thus tend towards populism and 
partisanship).  
35
 This formulation tracks Andrzej Rapaczynski, Constitutional Politics in Poland: A Report on the Constitutional 
Committee of the Polish Parliament, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 595, 619 (1991) (“In the system of proportional representation, 
this bargain [when a compromise is formed to produce an effective majority] is struck after the elections, when the 
parties must agree to form a government or pass new legislation. In the majoritarian system, by contrast, the key 
compromises are made before the election, when various social interests must come together around a party program that 
can gain a majority of the popular vote.”) (italics in original). For a further general treatment that also borrows from 
Rapacyski, see ISACHAROFF, KARLAN & PILDES, THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY 1162 (rev. 2d ed. 2002).  
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legitimacy in particular democratic systems each possess distinctive immanent logics. A democratic 
society may fall foul of the peculiar logic of democratic legitimation that its species of democracy 
adopts. The next two sections speculate that this has happened, straightforwardly in Europe and, less 
straightforwardly, in the United States as well. 
3 
The stylized distinction between European and Anglo-American models of democratic legitimation 
returns the argument to the crisis of democratic legitimacy from which it set out. Democratic politics 
structured on the Anglo-American model is well-suited to sustaining the democratic legitimacy of 
constitutional politics (in the loose sense). Democratic politics structured on the European model is 
less well-suited to that task. 
Begin with the Anglo-American model. Mass democratic politics on this model unifies the 
citizenry, integrating it into a single political agent. To begin with, successful candidates under the 
Anglo-American model tend to style their campaigns as a single political conversation among all the 
voters in their districts. They address every voter in their districts, as all and only these voters matter 
for their chances at electoral victory. As observed earlier, candidates will along the way tend towards 
political moderation, characterized in terms of the views of the median voter. This adds to political 
integration by reducing the extent to which substantive differences between a citizen and her 
representative become so great that no process values can bridge them. Finally, each official, under 
this system, becomes the only person to represent her constituents in connection with the election that 
she has won. This entails that the integrative powers of Anglo-American elections are reinforced by 
the integrative powers of Anglo-American governance. Elected officials, in the Anglo-American 
system, conduct an ongoing political engagement (concerning both constituent services and the 
common good) not just with their core supporters, nor even just with those constituents who voted for 
them, but in principle with all constituents.  
This model of political integration applies naturally not just to incremental but also to 
constitutional politics. The stakes may be higher in this case, but the legitimating patterns of 
democratic politics continue to engage citizens in the ordinary way. Quite possibly the quantity of 
democratic engagement must increase in order for the Anglo-American model to legitimate 
democratic decisions on constitutional questions. As political decisions become weightier, the unified 
political conversation that this model promotes must go on for longer, engage citizens more intensely, 
and perhaps even engage more publicly-minded motivations in order to sustain shared authorship of 
the collective decisions that it produces.
36
 But once the quantity has adjusted, the quality or form of the 
political engagement on the Anglo-American model remains suited to the legitimate resolution of 
constitutional questions. Citizens, after all continue to decide together. And quantitative increases in 
their political engagements cause their democratic integration to grow commensurately to the greater 
weight of the decisions that their constitutional politics involves. 
Democratic political engagement and integration function differently on the European model. 
Politics does not produce mass integration, among ordinary citizens, on this model at all. Campaigns 
do not address citizens together, across partisan disagreements. Rather, candidates principally address 
their supporters, and mass politics is principally limited to disputes within the party, about which 
platform planks will best promote the party’s core principles and grow its constituency. And officials 
do not represent citizens together, across partisan disagreements; rather, each official represents 
primarily her parties’ supporters.37 Political integration across partisan difference occurs directly, on 
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 Bruce Ackerman’s distinction between ordinary politics and higher lawmaking develops one model of this quantitative 
difference. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE, VOLUME I: FOUNDATIONS 230-294 (1993).  
37
 Not every system that employs proportional representation hews narrowly to the ideal type, in this respect. For example, 
the German electoral system—with the express aim of dispensing with party-intermediation and connecting 
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the European model, only at the official level, through the parliamentary bargaining that this model 
encourages and practically requires. The masses become integrated only indirectly, by proxy, in the 
manner in which principles might become bound to a contract negotiated by their agents. 
The European model of political integration is largely unproblematic when applied to incremental, 
non-constitutional politics. An agent may bind her principal to a contract, after all; indeed, for ordinary 
contracts made by agents, the principal becomes bound just as if she had contracted directly herself. 
But this model faces great challenges when applied to constitutional politics. Constitutional politics, 
recall, concerns the basic character of the political order: the boundary between members and non-
members; and, among members, the boundaries between their political associations and other features 
of their lives (religious, social, and economic, for example) that endure beyond the direct reach of the 
state. These matters are at once unusually weighty and have the character that they tend to develop 
organically, so that the outcomes of constitutional choices cannot be fully cabined ex ante, by the 
terms of constitutional compromises, fixed at the moments when they are struck. Constitutional 
arrangements are in this respect less like ordinary contracts and more like joint ventures or other 
fiduciary relationships.
38
 The analogy between European style democratic representation and the 
ordinary agency relation is once again instructive here. Ordinary agents cannot bind their principals to 
fiduciary arrangements as readily or completely as they can bind them to mere contracts. Instead, the 
law (for example through mechanisms of informed consent) requires that certain agreements, in order 
to be valid, must be made immediately by the principals whom they would bind. Similarly, European 
style democratic representatives cannot bind their constituents to new constitutional arrangements as 
readily or completely—with the same democratic legitimacy—as they might enjoy with respect to 
ordinary, incremental political choices. Constitutional democratic politics can be legitimate only 
insofar as it is carried out immediately among citizens themselves.  
4 
This analysis applies straightforwardly to Europe’s current crisis of democratic legitimacy. Insofar as 
the argument is correct, the European model of democratic legitimation is inadequate to the 
constitutional choices to which the interactions between the current financial crisis and the dynamics 
of European Union integration are putting member states. Indeed, certain European nations’ marginal 
departures from ideal-typical proportional representation further undermine the democratic legitimacy 
of their current constitutional politics. Greece is an example. For perfectly understandable reasons—
connected to an interest in avoiding intractable parliamentary gridlock—Greece’s voting system 
“reinforces” proportional representation by giving a 50 seat parliamentary “bonus” to the party that 
wins the plurality of votes in parliamentary elections.
39
 But for the very reason why the bonus 
increases parliamentary decisiveness, it decreases parliamentary bargaining and coalition-building. 
And that diminishes both the quantity of bargaining and the fairness (or quality) of the circumstances 
in which bargains are struck. The Greek variation on the European model thus reduces the extent even 
of citizens’ indirect political connection to policies whose adoption depends on the plurality party’s 
parliamentary bonus. In such cases, the parliamentary agents of citizens who voted for non-plurality 
(Contd.)                                                                  
representatives directly to voters—follows a complicated mechanism that ensures that even as the aggregate numbers of 
parliamentary seats each party holds are fixed through proportional representation, half of the individual seats are held by 
representatives who have won specific geographic districts. See Bundeswahlgesetz [BWG] [Federal Election Law] July 
23, 1993, BGBl I at 1594, §§ 4-6.  
38
 The idea that ordinary contracts fix the terms of the parties’ shared project ex ante, whereas more intimate joint projects 
allow the terms of sharing to develop organically ex post, follows Daniel Markovits, Promise as an Arm’s Length 
Relation, in H. SHEINMAN, ed. PROMISES AND AGREEMENTS: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS (2011) and Daniel Markovits and 
Alan Schwartz, The Myth of Efficient Breach: New Defenses of the Expectation Interest, 97 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW 1939 
(2011).  
39
 The law is Law 3636/2008, which amended Law 3231/2004 by extending the number of bonus seats from 40 to 50. The 
Greek text of the amendment can be found at http://www.dsanet.gr/Epikairothta/Nomothesia/n3636_08.htm.  
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parties (even if they remain faithful) have been rendered incapable of effectively representing their 
supporters in official negotiations. And the supporters remain commensurately unbound to the 
settlements that these negotiations reach. 
The American case is more surprising, because the United States does not as a formal matter 
employ proportional representation. Nevertheless, several recent developments in American electoral 
politics have inserted a close cousin of proportional representation into the American political system. 
Indeed, there is a sense in which, precisely because of this unnatural grafting, the pathological relation 
between proportional representation and constitutional politics reveals itself most plainly in the 
American context.  
The first such development concerns the constitution of the electoral districts into which voters are 
collected in order to elect members of the United States House of Representatives. These have 
changed, in recent decades, in response both to population migrations and to direct manipulation of 
their boundaries. 
Begin by considering district boundaries and the gerrymanders through which they have changed. 
These can serve many purposes. Some may seek to undermine political equality:
40
 to diminish the 
electoral opportunity of certain groups of voters, including most prominently racial groups;
41
 to 
increase a party’s legislative delegation in excess of the party’s popular support;42 or even to ensure or 
prevent that particular persons secure elective office.
43
 But gerrymanders may also serve another and 
very different purpose also. Especially when control over government is divided between two parties, 
the parties may collude, in bipartisan or sweetheart gerrymanders, to reallocate voters to concentrate 
them into safe districts that protect incumbents from each party against challengers from the other.
44
  
Next add migrations. The collusive efforts in bipartisan gerrymanders may be further re-enforced 
by partisan migrations, in which supporters of each party spontaneously concentrate themselves to 
further segregate electoral districts. An especially important case of this self-sorting, in the United 
States, has been the growing partisan divide between increasingly Democratic urban America and 
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 The wrongs in these types of gerrymanders—insofar as they are wrong—can be explained by instrumental accounts of 
democracy, including prominently by the liberal egalitarian account. Most straightforwardly, gerrymanders that achieve 
these ends by creating differences in the numerical sizes of voting districts violate the egalitarian ideal of one-person, 
one-vote. See generally Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). And these types of 
gerrymanders may violate equality even though they maintain equally sized districts, for example because (roughly) they 
apportion certain classes of voters to districts with the intent of concentrating or dispersing their votes to render their 
preferences less influential over the selection of representatives than the preferences of their fellow citizens. See 
generally Heather Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV. L. REV 1663 (2001).  
41
 White Southerners thus drew outlandish districts in order to reduce the influence of black voters after Reconstruction. 
See, e.g., J. Morgan Kousser, The Voting Rights Act and the Two Reconstructions, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY 
VOTING 135 (1992).  
42
 Alan I. Abramowitz finds evidence of Democratic redistricting for political advantage in the 1982 election of the United 
States House of Representatives, in Partisan Redistricting and the 1982 Congressional Elections, 45 J. POLITICS 767 
(1983).  
43
 Gerrymanders designed to keep specific people out of office have a long history in American politics. In 1789, for 
example, Patrick Henry allegedly designed a misshapen district in order to assist James Monroe’s run against James 
Madison in Virginia’s first congressional elections (the only instance in which two future presidents competed for a 
congressional seat). Madison won the seat nevertheless. See Thomas Rogers Hunter, The First Gerrymander, 9 EARLY 
AMERICAN STUDIES 781 (2011).  
44
 Examples of this practice are reported in Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 
593, 598 (2002) and David Mayhew, Congressional Representation: Theory and Practice in Drawing the Districts in 
Reapportionment in the 1970s at 249, 279 (Nelson W. Polsby, ed. 1971). It is not clear how prominent such 
gerrymanders are in practice. See Nathaniel Persily, In Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The Case for Judicial 
Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders, 116 HARV. L. REV. 649 (2002); David Mahew, Congressional 
Elections: The Case of the Vanishing Marginals, 6 POLITY 295 (1974); GARY JACOBSON, THE ELECTORAL ORIGINS OF 
DIVIDED GOVERNMENT: COMPETITION IN U.S. HOUSE ELECTIONS, 1946-1998, at 133 (1990).  
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increasingly Republican rural America. Between the 1996 and 2000 elections, for example, 2 rural 
counties changed from Republican to Democratic majorities and 854 changed from Democratic to 
Republican.
45
 
Some combination of bipartisan gerrymanders, partisan migrations, and other phenomena has 
caused partisan competition for seats in the United States House of Representatives to decline more or 
less steadily over the past half-century. To be sure, there exist local departures from longer trends 
(including most recently in the Tea-Party influenced 2010 congressional elections). But secular trends 
have been towards increased re-election rates for incumbents and increased margins of decision in 
races generally.
46
 This development need not promote a particular party’s political platform or 
otherwise shift the partisan balance of political power. Indeed, the development may cause the party-
balance in the legislature roughly (especially over time) to reflect the balance of support that the 
parties have in the population. The political composition of legislatures constituted through bipartisan 
gerrymanders and partisan migrations will in this case be more or less the same as it would be were 
the legislatures constituted through more competitive elections in more evenly balanced districts.  
Nevertheless, these developments remain intuitively troubling. It is not easy to give this intuition a 
theoretically articulate defense, even for the case in which the lack of competition is intentionally 
engineered by through sweetheart gerrymanders. The difficulty is particularly acute from within the 
liberal model of democracy as political equality. As Samuel Issacharoff has said, if a gerrymander 
“were to provide . . . political parties with reasonable prospects of achieving . . . their appropriate 
shares of representation, . . . [f]rom the vantage point of equal protection law, neither party should be 
considered a victim of discrimination.”47 The observation applies all the more if the safe districts arise 
spontaneously from partisan migrations. Moreover, insofar as the bipartisan gerrymanders adjust (at 
least over time) to keep the party-balance that they establish in line with the balance of the parties’ 
popular support, individual citizens also continue equally to influence the makeup of the legislature, 
only now indirectly through influencing the balance of safe districts rather than by directly influencing 
the outcomes of competitive elections. Accordingly, the natural categories in which the liberal 
approach to democracy proceeds do not readily apply to such cases. In the words of the Supreme 
Court, redistricting pursued with the “conscious intent to . . . achieve a rough approximation of the 
statewide political strengths of the Democratic and Republican parties,” satisfies the “spirit of 
fairness.”48 Indeed, bipartisan gerrymanders may even increase the accuracy with which the 
composition of the legislature tracks the popular political balance, at least compared to what the 
Supreme Court called “a politically mindless approach” that ignores the electoral consequences of 
drawing district lines.
49
 
The republican theory of democracy better explains the intuitive discomfort that bipartisan 
gerrymanders and other forms of partisan voter concentration engender. Observe a relationship 
between such developments and proportional representation.
50
 Under proportional representation, each 
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 See BILL BISHOP, THE BIG SORT: WHY THE CLUSTERING OF LIKE-MINDED AMERICA IS TEARING US APART 269 (2008). 
46
 See, e.g., Alan I. Abramowitz, Brad Alexander, and Matthew Gunning, Incumbency, Redistricting, and the Decline of 
Competition in U.S. House Elections, 68 J. POL. 75 (2006). 
47
 Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 593, 598 (2002).  
48
 Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 752 (1973). The Gaffney Court added that judicial scrutiny over district lines should 
be “at its lowest ebb when a State purports fairly to allocate political power to the parties in accordance with their voting 
strength and, within quite tolerable limits, succeeds in doing so.” Id. at 754.  
49
 Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 752 (1973). The effect of such reasoning is so powerful that the Supreme Court has 
insulated districts whose lines are based on incumbent protection from challenges invoking the race-based theories 
adopted in Shaw and its progeny. See Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001).  
50
 Others have noticed that gerrymanders can have the effect of allocating representatives to political parties in proportion to 
the parties’ popular support. See Persily, supra at 668 (“[B]ipartisan gerrymanders often produce proportional 
representation.”); DOUGLAS W. RAE, THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE ELECTION LAWS 96-97 (1967) (observing that 
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representative is elected from a constituency that has no physical form but instead consists of an equal 
number of geographically dispersed and isolated voters who have all voted for her. And all 
representatives save those at the very bottoms of their parties’ lists have safe seats. In both respects, 
proportional representation is just the perfect accomplishment of the political concentration that 
bipartisan gerrymanders and partisan migrations both tend towards.  
These developments might thus (at least in an ideal world) share in the fairness that explains 
proportional representation’s appeal in ordinary politics. But they also share in proportional 
representation’s infirmities with respect to sustaining the democratic legitimacy of constitutional 
politics. Political concentration renders mass political engagement across ideological divides 
unnecessary for winning elections, because candidates in their custom-made constituencies can rely on 
majorities that they have acquired by the selection of their voters rather than by engaging them. 
Partisan voter concentration is therefore engagement-defeating, so that it reduces the connection 
between democratic politics and reciprocal recognition on which the appeal and authority of 
democratic government—especially with respect to constitutional politics—is built.51 
Indeed, the democratic infirmities of constitutional politics carried out following bipartisan 
gerrymanders and partisan migrations may be still greater than in proportional representation. The 
stealth version of proportional representation will legitimate even less effectively than the open 
version, for at least two reasons. First, a political system that implements proportional representation 
by stealth will likely not have adjusted the structure of its democracy at the official level to ensure 
bargaining among representatives of the sort that legitimates ideal-typical proportional representation. 
And second, the political system will likely not have adjusted the structure of its political parties to 
ensure that representatives remain faithful agents of their partisan constituents in the manner that the 
legitimacy of proportional representation requires.
52
 Both phenomena might plausibly be at play in the 
United States today. The government’s enduring presidential structure discourages productive cross 
(Contd.)                                                                  
the 1957 election to the US House of Representatives produced very nearly perfect proportional representation: “on 
average, each party’s share of the seats deviated by only [0.57] percent from its share of the popular vote.”) I believe that 
it has not been noticed that proportional representation is the formal equivalent of a partisan voter concentration—that 
partisan voter concentration does not just produce the balance among elected officials that proportional representation 
produces, but in fact is proportional representation, at least in the limiting case.  
51
 Bipartisan gerrymanders and partisan migrations are not the only innovation of modern politics to have this feature. 
Instead, they are of a piece with a series of other electioneering techniques that have been developed or improved in 
recent years—focus groups, opinion polls, narrowly differentiated political advertising, and focused get-out-the-vote 
efforts—all of which share that they allow candidates to segregate and to choose their voters rather than allowing voters 
to choose their candidates. (Bipartisan gerrymanders are only the most literal way of doing this.) None of these 
techniques can naturally be said to violate liberal equality. But they all reduce the degree to which mass democratic 
politics constitutes a genuine engagement among citizens across ideological difference. And they therefore all reduce the 
democratic legitimacy, at least on the republican model.  
52
 It may be that, especially over time, bipartisan gerrymanders partisan migrations encourage the development of party 
discipline resembling that which arises under proportional representation. Certainly the increased importance of party 
primaries would make it natural to divert political energies to promoting ideological development and purity within the 
party. But even if this process is real and does increase within-party political engagement in American politics, it will not 
be enough to secure the democratic legitimacy of the elections on the republican model of democracy. The enduring 
dominance of the two big parties means that (especially when one party controls all three branches of government) the 
negotiation and coalition building among many small parties at the official level associated with true proportional 
representation remains absent from the American political scene. Thus, although increasingly ideological and disciplined 
parties might integrate their own members (across whatever political differences these members have), the second level 
of integrating engagements, across parties, that proportional representation provides will remain absent from American 
politics. Indeed, this combination may be especially threatening to democratic legitimacy, as within party engagements 
(producing partisan blocks of citizens) shift the burdens of democratic legitimation from the popular to the official level 
of democracy even as the interactions at the official level remain wholly unsuited to carrying this burden. And indeed, 
something like this seems, at least on casual observation, to be happening in American politics today.  
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party bargaining at the representative level. And the relative lack of intra-party discipline leaves 
ideologically committed constituents feeling that their representatives are unfaithful agents.
53
  
Similarly, although perhaps less pronounced, stealth shifts towards proportional representation 
have occurred in elections for the United States Senate. Senate districts are of course constitutionally 
fixed to match state boundaries. They thus cannot be gerrymandered. Nevertheless, an arrangement 
analogous to that plaguing House districts may be produced by partisan migrations working alone. 
And indeed, something very like this is occurring, as citizens who affiliate with the Democratic Party 
concentrate themselves in the Northeast and on the West Coast, and citizens who affiliate with the 
Republican Party concentrate themselves in the Midwest and the South. Thus, although higher 
percentage of seats remains genuinely competitive in the Senate than in the House, the percentage of 
competitive Senate seats has also been shrinking in recent years.
54
 And Senators have become less 
moderate and more partisan
55—more like officials who have been elected under proportional 
representation and whose constituents are drawn less from their districts and more from their parties’ 
supporters. 
Finally, although now more modestly still, population migrations have perhaps also pushed 
Presidential elections towards a de facto model of proportional representation. This straightforwardly 
follows from the developments in the Senate coupled with the fact that delegates to the Electoral 
College are allocated by state. Partisan migrations subject Presidential campaigns to forces much like 
those that have shaped Senate campaigns. True first-past-the-post Presidential campaigning occurs 
principally in the battleground states. And although the data are insufficient to sustain confident 
conclusions, the number of these appears to be shrinking.
56
 
In all these respects, developments taking place outside of the formal system of vote-counting in 
the United States have pushed the substance of this system in the direction of proportional 
representation. It seems unlikely, given this convergence, that American democracy is able entirely to 
resist the infirmities that proportional representation suffers when called on to legitimate constitutional 
politics. At the same time, the United States faces constitutional choices no less than Europe does, 
even if the nature of the choices and of their causes differs slightly. American democracy as drawn up 
and as practiced historically might have been better suited to legitimating constitutional decisions; but 
the American system is losing this advantage even as the pressures on its legitimacy mount. 
                                                     
53
 This phenomenon is illustrated by the Democratic base’s disillusionment with moderate or blue dog Democrats and the 
Republican base’s disillusionment with Republican legislators regarded as party members in name only, or RINOs.  
54
 One can see this simply by counting how many Senate elections have been close and how many blowouts over the years. 
Thus, between 2002 and 2008 only 22% of Senate elections were close (in the sense of being decided by a margin of less 
than 10%) and 55% of elections were blowouts (decided by more than 20%). In the 1960s and 1970s, by contrast, 
roughly 40% of Senate elections were close and roughly 40% were blowouts. And in the 1980s and 1990s, these numbers 
were roughly 30% and 50%, respectively. These counts come from Alan I. Abramowitz, U.S. Senate Elections in a 
Polarized Era, Table 5, available at 
 http://www.vanderbilt.edu/csdi/archived/Bicameralism%20papers/abromowitz3.pdf.  
55
 The prevalence of party-line voting has increased dramatically over the past four decades. See generally Larry Bartels, 
Partisanship and Voting Behavior, 1952-1996 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 35 (2000). A more recent account of “party unity” – a 
measure of the “degree to which members of Congress align with their parties on votes that pit a majority of Democrats 
against a majority of Republicans” – reports an increase from roughly 70% in both chambers of Congress in 1956 to 91% 
for House and Senate Democrats, 87% for House Republicans, and 85% for Senate Republicans. See Pietro Nivola, 
Partisanship in Perspective, National Affairs (2010), http://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/partisanship-in-
perspective.  
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 17 states were decided by less than 5% in the 1992 Presidential election; 11 in 1996; 12 in 2000; 11 in 2004; and 6 in 
2008. This trend cannot be explained by the closeness of the national electoral counts in the respective races.  
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These pages thus suggest a theoretical connection between the prominence of proportional 
representation in mature modern democracies and the crisis of legitimacy that these democracies face. 
The connection is surprising, in some instances twice over. First, proportional representation has 
received excellent press in contemporary political thought, and so a report of its distinctive 
shortcomings might for this reason alone be news concerning norms. And second, the stealth insertion 
of proportional representation into the political order of the United States is underappreciated, so that a 
report of it states news concerning facts. Both pieces of news are potentially important, as proportional 
representation is ill-suited to sustaining democratic legitimacy in the face of the constitutional choices 
that both European and American democracies currently face. The argument developed here 
speculatively suggests a connection between consequence and cause. 
To be sure, lived political legitimacy is a complex phenomenon, and its causes are commensurately 
elusive. Probably no method exists precisely to apportion fluctuations in lived legitimacy among their 
several possible causes. Certainly the philosophically informed armchair speculation pursued in this 
Working Paper cannot do so. 
But speculative approaches remain valuable nevertheless. Persons are reflective creatures, and this 
makes it natural for the experience of political legitimacy to respond to whether or not that experience 
is warranted. (This is especially so where, as in the republican approach to democratic legitimacy 
pursued in these pages, mechanisms for sustaining the experience of legitimacy are built into the 
theory of legitimacy’s warrant.) Moreover, the question whether or not political legitimacy is 
warranted remains important even apart from whether the warrant can be translated into lived 
experience. 
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